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MCCUTCHEON V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
AND THE SUPREME COURT’S NARROWED
DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION
Mikala Noe*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 17, 1972, five men were caught attempting to bug the offices of the
Democratic National Committee in the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C.1
The first link between this break-in and President Richard Nixon’s re-election
campaign funds was discovered when a $25,000 cashier’s check, earmarked for
Nixon’s re-election fund, was found to have been deposited into the bank account
of one of the men involved in the break-in.2 Shortly thereafter, reporters revealed
that then U.S. Attorney General John N. Mitchell controlled a secret campaign fund
used to gather information about the Democratic Party.3 During the resulting
Watergate investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation “established that
hundreds of thousands of dollars in Nixon campaign contributions had been set
aside to pay for an extensive undercover campaign aimed at discrediting individual
Democratic presidential candidates and disrupting their campaigns.”4 Nearly one
year after the Watergate break-in, President Nixon accepted the responsibility of
the actions taken by his subordinates and appointed a new Attorney General,
recommending changes in the law “to prevent future campaign abuses of the sort
recently uncovered,” referring to the secret election funds.5 On August 8, 1974,
President Nixon formally announced his resignation.6 The Watergate scandal

* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maine School of Law. The Author is grateful to Dmitry
Bam and Zachary Heiden for their invaluable insight into the world of campaign finance, and to her
colleagues on Maine Law Review for their tireless assistance throughout the editing process. The
Author would like to say thank you to her friends and family for their unwavering support and
strength. The Author is especially appreciative of her grandmother, Jackie Little, for always being her
number one editor.
1. Alfred Lewis, 5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats’ Office Here, WASH. POST (June 18, 1972),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005111001227.html
(reportedly the third break-in to the Democratic National Committee’s offices).
2. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Bug Suspect Got Campaign Funds, WASH. POST (Aug. 1,
1972),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bug-suspect-got-campaign-funds/2012/06/06/
gJQAyTjKJV_story.html.
3. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, Mitchell Controlled Secret GOP Fund, WASH. POST (Sept.
29, 1972), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitchell-controlled-secret-gop-fund/2012/06/06/
gJQAOcAKJV_story.html.
4. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. POST
(Oct. 10, 1972), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-finds-nixon-aides-sabotaged-democrats/
2012/06/06/gJQAoHIJJV_story.html.
5. Laurence Stern & Haynes Johnson, 3 Top Nixon Aides, Kleindienst Out; President Accepts Full
R espon sibilit y; Richa rdson Will Conduct New Probe , W A S H . P O S T (M a y 1, 1973 ),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/3-top-nixon-aides-kleindienst-out-president-accepts-fullresponsibility-richardson-will-conduct-new-probe/2012/06/04/gJQAx7oFJV_story.html.
6. Richard Nixon, President of the U.S., Resignation Speech (Aug. 8, 1974), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/spc/character/links/nixon_speech.html.
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served as “the impetus for the last wave of campaign finance reform.”7
The dictionary definition of corruption includes: “dishonest or illegal behavior
especially by powerful people”;8 “dishonest proceedings”; “bribery”; “perversion
of integrity”; “depravity”;9 and “a vicious and fraudulent intention to evade the
prohibitions of the law.”10 The Supreme Court once subscribed to this very broad
definition of corruption.11 However, over time, the Court has adapted a narrower
view of corruption. Instead of corruption including all dishonest or illegal behavior
and a fraudulent intention to evade the law, today’s Supreme Court defines
corruption solely as quid pro quo.12 Quid pro quo corruption is the trading of one
thing for another; in campaign finance, it’s often the trading of money to be used to
get the candidate into office (through campaign contributions) in exchange for a
benefit after the candidate takes office.13 As the definition of corruption has
become narrower, the Supreme Court has begun to overturn campaign finance
laws, finding that the laws are not tailored closely enough to the purpose of
preventing this type of corruption.
On April 2, 2014, the Supreme Court overturned a portion of campaign finance
law. The Supreme Court in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,14 held
that aggregate limits on political campaign contributions “intrude without
justification on a citizen’s ability to exercise ‘the most fundamental First
Amendment activities.’”15 Aggregate limits were created by the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971,16 and later amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act in 2002.17 These aggregate limits provided that a single person could donate
up to a certain fixed amount every two years to political campaigns and
committees.18 Contrary to aggregate contribution limits that govern how much a
person can donate to all candidates or committees, individual contribution limits
restrict how much money a person can donate to a single candidate or committee.19
Congress created aggregate limits to prevent evasion of other campaign finance
contribution laws, including individual limits, and to further the government’s anticorruption interest.20
Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee (RNC) brought
7. Donald J. Simon, Beyond Post-Watergate Reform: Putting an End to the Soft Money System, 24
J. LEGIS. 167, 167 (1998).
8. Corruption, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruption.
9. Corruption, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/corruption?s=t.
10. Corruption, Black’s Law Dictionary 281 (11th ed. 2004).
11. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 143 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
12. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
13. Robert Barnes, The High Court: When is a campaign contribution a bribe?, WASH. POST (Aug.
12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-high-court-when-is-a-campaign-contribution-abribe/2012/08/12/68cdd94e-e2f9-11e1-a25e-15067bb31849_story.html.
14. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460.
15. Id. at 1462 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)).
16. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub.L. 92–225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as
2 U.S.C.A. § 431).
17. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), PL 107–155, 116 Stat 81 (2002).
18. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443.
19. Id. at 1442.
20. Id.
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the challenge against restrictions in campaign finance contribution law.21
McCutcheon was a frequent contributor to political campaigns but due to the
aggregate limits, was unable to contribute to as many candidates as he wished.22
Additionally, the RNC wished to receive as many contributions as McCutcheon
wanted to make but could not due to the same aggregate limit.23 Both appellants
argued that the aggregate limits on campaign contributions violated their First
Amendment rights.24 In McCutcheon, the Court focused on a narrow definition of
corruption to determine that the Government’s interest in preventing corruption and
the appearance of corruption did not outweigh a person’s First Amendment right to
contribute to political campaigns, and thus removed aggregate limits from
campaign finance law.25
McCutcheon is met with a sharply divided audience. Some characterize the
Supreme Court’s holding as “obvious common sense,”26 others, as “a devastating
blow to our democratic system.”27 This Note begins in Part II by briefly examining
the complex history of campaign finance reform, the movement to analyze
restrictions on contributions and expenditures under the First Amendment’s
freedom of expression, and the Supreme Court’s shifting definition of corruption.
Part III examines the facts and procedural background of McCutcheon, in
particular, the Supreme Court’s approach to defining corruption in campaign
financing. Part IV will suggest the impact this decision will have on political
campaigns. This Note contends that the Government’s justifications for enacting
the aggregate limits were sufficient for the Court to uphold the limitation. This
Note further contends that the Supreme Court maintains an unreasonably narrow
definition of corruption in campaign finance laws. The U.S. Congress should act
and pass a law to overturn the Supreme Court’s troubling narrow quid pro quo
definition of corruption to protect the anti-corruption interests in American
democracy.
II. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
A. The Early History of Campaign Finance Reform
In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt listed his first item of congressional
business as creating “a law prohibiting political contributions by corporations.”28
This request came after Roosevelt’s election garnered a “‘popular feeling . . . that
aggregated capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of

21. Id. at 1443.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1462.
26. Ashby Jones, Legal Experts React to Supreme Court’s Campaign-Finance Ruling, Blog, WALL
ST. J. (April 2, 2014 12:42 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/04/02/legal-experts-react-to-supremecourts-campaign-finance-ruling/ (quoting Bradley Smith, former Federal Election Commissioner and
current law professor at Capital University).
27. Id. (quoting Robert Weissman, president of Public Citizen).
28. United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. (UAWCIO), 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957).
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corruption.’”29 The idea was to prevent the wealthy from using corporate funds to
send candidates to the legislature who in turn would protect and advance the
interests of the wealthy.30 In 1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act to address this
concern.31 The Tillman Act was “the first concrete manifestation of a continuing
congressional concern for elections ‘free from the power of money.’”32 Shortly
after its passage, the Act was amended to require the disclosure of House and
Senate race campaign contributions.33
34
Then, in 1925, Congress passed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
The FCPA was “limited to general election activities and required the disclosure of
contributions and expenditures by candidates and political action committees
(PACs).”35 In debating this Act, Senator Robinson stated that,
Many believe that when an individual or association of individuals makes large
contributions for the purpose of aiding candidates of political parties in winning
the elections, they expect, and sometimes demand, and occasionally, at least,
receive, consideration by the beneficiaries of their contributions which not
infrequently is harmful to the general public interest. It is unquestionably an evil
36
which ought to be dealt with, and dealt with intelligently and effectively.

The first individuals charged with violating the Act were two members of a
political election committee, Ada L. Burroughs and James Cannon, Jr.37 In 1932,
Burroughs, acting as treasurer, “accepted contributions and made expenditures for
the purpose of influencing and attempting to influence the election of presidential
and vice presidential electors in two states.”38 Burroughs was alleged to have
violated the FCPA by failing to report the names and addresses of contributors,
with the amount and date of each contribution.39 In defending himself, Burroughs
argued that the sections of the Act relating to presidential electors were
unconstitutional because they sought to regulate “political activities pertaining to
the appointment of the electors,” a power that is conferred solely upon the state.40
In Burroughs v. United States,41 the Supreme Court held that Congress has the
29. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003) (quoting United States v. Auto.
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957)).
30. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 571 (quoting the statement made by Rep. Elihu Root) (“The idea is to
prevent . . . the great aggregations of wealth from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to
send members of the legislature to these halls in order to vote for their protection and the advancement
of their interests as against those of the public.”), hearing before the H. Comm. on Elections, 59th Cong.
12 (1905).
31. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
32. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 575.
33. Publicity Act of 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910) (repealed 1925).
34. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, Ch. 368, §§ 302, 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925)
(repealed 1971).
35. Debra Burke, Twenty Years After the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974:
Look Who’s Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REV. 357, 358 (1995).
36. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 576-77 (citing 65 Cong. Rec. 9507—9508 (1925)).
37. United States v. Burroughs, 65 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1933) aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934).
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power to pass laws that are “essential to preserve the departments and institutions
of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by
force or by corruption.”42 Focusing on the corruptive effect of money in politics,
the Supreme Court determined that Congress “reached the conclusion that public
disclosure of political contributions, together with the names of contributors and
other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections.”43
The Court recognized that the Act sought to “preserve the purity of presidential and
vice presidential elections.”44 “To say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper use of
money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power
of self-protection.”45
The Hatch Act Amendments of 1940 imposed the first yearly limit on
individual contributions to federal candidates and national party committees for
officers and employees of the government.46 Section 13(a) made it unlawful for
any person to contribute more than $5,000 during a calendar year to any campaign
or national committee.47 In 1943, Congress took it a step further and passed the
Smith-Connally Act, prohibiting “labor organizations from making contributions in
connect[ion] with federal elections.”48 Congress hoped the Smith-Connally Act
would reduce the undue influence of labor on elections.49 However, after the 1944
presidential election, Congress recognized a loophole in existing law that confined
the definition of contribution so that it could be read to apply to only direct gifts or
payments, not expenditures made by labor organizations on behalf of candidates.50
Acknowledging the loophole, and further amending part of the FCPA, Congress
passed the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 making it unlawful for any
national bank or organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection
with any election for political office.51
Two cases were brought before the Court challenging the Labor Management
Relations Act. In United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,52 the
Supreme Court recognized that Congress intended the Labor Management
Relations Act to destroy “the influence over elections which corporations exercised

42. Id. at 545.
43. Id. at 548.
44. Id. at 544.
45. Id. at 545.
46. Hatch Act, 54 Stat. 767, ch. 640, §13(a) (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 594,
595, 598, 600, 601, 604, 605 (2014)).
47. Id. (“It shall be unlawful, for any person, directly or indirectly, to make contributions in an
aggregate amount in excess of $5,000, during any calendar year, or in connection with any campaign for
nomination or election, to or on behalf of any candidate for an elective Federal office . . . or to or on
behalf of any committee or other organization engaged in furthering, advancing, or advocating the
nomination or election of any candidate for any such officer or the success of any national political
party.”)
48. Comment, Regulation of Labor’s Political Contributions and Expenditures: the British and
American Experience, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 371, 373 (1952).
49. Id.
50. United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 115 (1948).
51. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 149 § 313.
52. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. at 106.

2014]

MCCUTCHEON V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

169

through financial contribution.”53 Then, in United States v. International Union
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW-CIO),54 the Supreme Court held that the use of union dues to create a
television commercial designed to influence Congressional elections violated the
FCPA.55 In so holding, the Court recognized Congress’s intent in passing the
Labor Management Relations Act as one “to protect the political process from what
it deemed to be the corroding effect of money employed in elections by aggregated
power.”56 These two early cases demonstrate Congress’s concern for money in
politics and the possible corruptive effect it presents.
The next major campaign finance law was not passed until 1971. The Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)57 repealed the FCPA.58 FECA set out
guidelines for campaign communications,59 placed limitations on contributions and
expenditures,60 and required the disclosure of campaign contributions.61 Then came
Watergate. Public cynicism about the campaign finance process resulted from
shady government decisions benefitting large contributors.62 For example, the
Nixon campaign received more than $1.7 million in campaign contributions from
people who were later appointed to be ambassadors.63
In 1974, following the campaign finance law violations by President Richard
Nixon, Congress passed amendments to FECA.64 These amendments “placed
limits on the amounts that individuals could contribute to candidates and political
committees and limited spending by candidates in federal elections.”65 These
limitations included:
A $1,000 limit on individuals donating to a candidate for federal office, limiting
the donation of Political Action Committees (PACs) to $5,000 per election,
limiting donations to national committees of political parties to $20,000 a year for
individuals and $15,000 a year for PACs, and an aggregate cap of $25,000 a year
on the amount an individual could contribute to all federal candidates, national
66
parties, and PACs.

The aggregate caps were meant to close loopholes in previous laws allowing
candidates to “use an unlimited number of political committees for fundraising
53. Id. at 113.
54. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 588 (1957).
55. Id. at 567.
56. Id. at 582.
57. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub.L. 92–225, Feb. 7, 1972, 86 Stat. 3
(codified as 2 U.S.C.A. §431) (hereinafter FECA).
58. See Burke, supra note 35, at 359.
59. FECA, Title 1, § 101.
60. Id. at Title 2, § 608.
61. Id. at Title 3, § 302.
62. Simon, supra note 7, at 168. For a more in-depth review of such practices, see Ciara TorresSpelliscy, How Much Is an Ambassadorship? And the Tale of How Watergate Led to A Strong Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act and A Weak Federal Election Campaign Act, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 71, 71-94 (2012).
63. Id.
64. Brandi Cherie Sablatura, Reformation of 527 Organizations: Closing the Soft Money Loophole
Created by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 66 LA. L. REV. 809, 817-18 (2006).
65. Id. at 818.
66. Id.
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purposes.”67 The FECA Amendments went into effect on October 15, 1974.68
B. Buckley v. Valeo69
Shortly after the FECA Amendments went into effect, Senator James Buckley,
among others, filed suit against Francis R. Valeo, the Secretary of the Senate, in a
case that became known as Buckley v. Valeo.70 The complainants sought a
declaratory judgment that the FECA Amendments were unconstitutional and an
injunction against enforcement of those provisions.71 The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia recognized the government’s “clear and
compelling interest in safeguarding the integrity of elections and avoiding the
undue influence of wealth,” stating that “[b]oth the reality and appearance of
electoral corruption justify Congressional intervention.”72
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that individual contribution limits, the
disclosure and reporting provisions, and the public financing scheme were
constitutional; however, the limitations on candidate expenditures were not
constitutional.73 In its discussion, the Supreme Court focused on the complainant’s
First Amendment argument and characterized campaign contributions as free
speech:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his
views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The
quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with
the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution
provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the
candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate
or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss
candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if
spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone
74
other than the contributor.

Even though the Court recognized that individual campaign contributions and
expenditures were a recognized form of constitutionally protected speech, the
Court held that the $1,000 individual contribution limit was constitutionally
justified.75 In so holding, the Court weighed a person’s First Amendment right
67. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 118 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
68. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. 93–443, Oct. 15, 1974, 88 Stat. 1263.
69. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
70. Id. at 7-9.
71. Id. at 8-9.
72. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 424 U.S. 1 96
S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976), and modified, 532 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
73. 424 U.S. at 143.
74. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
75. Id.
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with the primary purpose of the Act, to limit corruption.76 Although the Court
determined that the limit regulated speech,77 the limit did not affect a person’s
ability to “engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through
volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial
extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources.”78 In
determining that the individual contribution limit was justified, the Court addressed
the possibility of corruption: “of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid
pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from
public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large
individual financial contributions.”79 According to the Court, the great interest in
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption justified limiting a person’s
political contribution to an individual candidate or committee.80
The Court’s
However, there were several shortcomings in FECA.81
determination that expenditure limitations were unconstitutional allowed campaign
costs to rise.82 In the mid-1990s, political parties began using soft money more
frequently.83 Money donated in violation of campaign finance law is considered
soft money.84 Soft money contributions are often large donations by corporations,
unions, or individuals to a political party who in turn use the donation for “party
building purposes.”85 Soft money, often used for grass-roots activities, includes
money spent on printing campaign materials, get-out-the-vote efforts, and voter
registration.86 Soft money spending grew from $86 million in 1992 to $495 million
in 2000.87 “This unlimited party spending permitted corporations, unions,
individuals, and other interested entities to evade contribution limits by channeling
money through political parties, potentially leading to a quid pro quo.”88
C. The Slow Decline of Campaign Finance Restrictions
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) amended FECA.89
This law was the result of a six-year political struggle and “is the most significant

76. Id.
77. Id. at 19 (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the
number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”).
78. Id. at 28.
79. Id. at 27.
80. Id. at 28.
81. See generally 148 CONG. REC. S33 (daily ed. March 20, 2002), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2002-03-20/pdf/CREC-2002-03-20-senate.pdf.
82. See Simon, supra note 7, at 170 (“The invalidation of spending limits resulted in the
unrestrained ability of campaign costs to rise, while money into campaigns continued to be subject to
limits.”).
83. George Comeau, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 40 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 253, 260 (2003).
84. Simon, supra note 7, at 175.
85. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
86. Comeau, supra note 83, at 253 n.58-59.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 259 (emphasis in the original).
89. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 114 (2003) overruled by Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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change in federal campaign finance law” since FECA.90 Included in BCRA was a
prohibition against soft money,91 an increase in the individual contribution
limitations,92 and an increase in the aggregate limit on individual contributions.93
Several suits challenging the Act’s constitutionality followed its passing. These
suits were combined into McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.94 In
upholding the prohibition on soft money, the Supreme Court stated that this Act
“does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and
unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal
candidates, and federal officeholders.”95
The Court used a broad definition of corruption, worrying about the influence
large sums of money might have on elections.96 The Court’s definition of
corruption included improper influence and opportunities for abuse, in addition to
quid pro quo arrangements.97 Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, argued for a more narrow definition to include only quid pro quo corruption.
In Justice Kennedy’s opinion, “only a single definition of corruption has been
found to identify political corruption successfully and to distinguish good political
responsiveness from bad—that is quid pro quo.”98 Justices Stevens and O’Connor
wrote for the majority regarding Titles I (regulating the use of soft money) and II
(prohibiting corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for
communications that are intended to influence federal election outcomes). The
opinion stated that Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of corruption was too narrow
and would “render Congress powerless to address more subtle but equally
dispiriting forms of corruption.”99 It is obvious throughout the McConnell opinion
that the Supreme Court was split on the definition of corruption.
In 2006, the Supreme Court heard a case challenging a Vermont campaign
finance statute that regulated both the amount a candidate could spend on their
campaign, and the amount individuals, organizations, and political parties could
contribute to those campaigns.100 In Randall v. Sorrell, the Supreme Court held
that both limitations were unconstitutional.101 In so holding, the Supreme Court
explained that the Act burdened “First Amendment interests by threatening to
inhibit effective advocacy by those who seek election, particularly challengers; its
90. Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1180 (2002).
91. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, PL 107–155, §323(a)(1), 116 Stat 81 (codified at 2
U.S.C. 441(i) (2014) (“A national committee of a political party (including a national congressional
campaign committee of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a
contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not
subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.”).
92. Id. at §307(a).
93. Id. at §307(b).
94. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) overruled by Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
95. Id. at 138.
96. See id. at 144.
97. Id. at 143.
98. Id. at 297.
99. Id. at 153.
100. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 230 (2006).
101. Id.
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contribution limits mute the voice of political parties; they hamper participation in
campaigns through volunteer activities; and they are not indexed for inflation.”102
Further, the Court stated that the Act burdened speech disproportionately to serving
the interests of prevention of actual or apparent corruption.103 This was the first
time the Supreme Court struck down a campaign contribution limit.
Then, in 2010, a nonprofit corporation, Citizens United, wished to sell a
documentary critical of a candidate for the 2008 Presidential primary election they
produced to a cable company for on-demand viewing; the promotion of the film
would include two short ads for the film.104 Citizens United feared that the ads
would qualify as an electioneering communication, defined as “any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general
Fearing that the film and ads qualified as electioneering
election.”105
communication, Citizens United brought a suit seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against the FEC as a preemptive move to avoid civil and criminal penalties
associated with the prohibition against electioneering communication.106 The suit
alleged that section 203 of BCRA, prohibiting electioneering communication, was
unconstitutional.107 In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the
Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that the First Amendment
protection applies to corporations.108 The Government argued that corporate
political speech should “be banned in order to prevent corruption or its
appearance.”109 The Supreme Court, citing Buckley, held that “‘the interest in
preventing corruption . . . [was] inadequate to justify [the ban] on independent
expenditures.’”110 Suggesting it would be impossible to use these types of
expenditures for quid pro quo corruption, the Court held “that independent
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption
or the appearance of corruption.”111 The Court turned toward a narrow definition
of corruption, which included only quid pro quo corruption, believing that the
broader definition (including the appearance of influence or access) would not
cause voters to lose faith in the democracy.112 The Supreme Court held that the
federal statute barring independent corporate expenditures for electioneering
communications violated the First Amendment, overruling McConnell.113
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Id. at 357.
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III. THE MCCUTCHEON DECISION
A. Factual Background
As previously stated, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act in
2002. Although focused on eliminating soft money, BCRA increased the
contribution limitations from FECA in order to account for inflation.114 BCRA
allowed “an individual to contribute up to $2,600 per election per candidate . . .;
$32,400 per year to a national party committee; $10,000 per year to a state or local
party committee; and $5,000 per year to a political action committee.”115
Additionally, for the 2013-2014 election cycle, the BCRA provided aggregate
limits: an individual could contribute $48,600 to federal candidates for office and
$74,600 to other political committees.116 In total, an individual could donate
$123,200 to candidates and non-candidate committees in a two-year election
cycle.117
During the 2011-2012 election cycle, Shaun McCutcheon contributed a total of
over $33,000 to sixteen different federal candidates, complying with the base
requirements for each candidate.118 McCutcheon wished to contribute to more
candidates but was unable to do so because of the aggregate limits of BCRA.119
Additionally, McCutcheon alleged that he wished to increase his donation even
more during the 2013-2014 election cycle, but would be prevented from doing so
under BCRA and FECA.120 Co-appellant, the Republican National Committee
(RNC), wished to receive contributions by McCutcheon and other similarly
situated people, but was unable to do so because of the aggregate limits on
contributions to political committees.121
B. Procedural History
In accordance with BCRA § 403(a)(1), McCutcheon and the RNC filed a
complaint before a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.122 McCutcheon and the RNC claimed that the aggregate
limits on contributions to individuals and committees were unconstitutional under
the First Amendment, and sought to enjoin the enforcement of such limits.123 In
response, the Government moved to dismiss the case.124 The District Court denied
the preliminary injunction and granted the Government’s request for dismissal.125
In so holding, the District Court stated that the limits were “valid expressions of the
government’s anti-corruption interest” and that the “aggregate limits . . . prevent
114.
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120.
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evasion of the base limits.”126 McCutcheon and the RNC appealed directly to the
Supreme Court.127
C. Arguments and Decision of the Court
Appellants argued that the aggregate limits on campaign contributions
restricted their First Amendment right to free speech.128 Appellants challenged the
“distinct legal arguments that Buckley did not consider,” specifically the overbreadth challenge of the aggregate limits.129 The Government argued that
aggregate limits prevent the circumvention of individual limits thus serving the
Government’s legitimate interest in combating political corruption.130 To support
its position, the Government offered several scenarios demonstrating how the
aggregate limits further their anti-circumvention interest.131 First, the Government
argued, “there is an opportunity for corruption whenever a large check is given to a
legislator, even if the check consists of contributions within the base limits to be
appropriately divided among numerous candidates and committees.”132 The
Government further argued that the solicitation of large contributions posed a
danger for corruption.133
The Court held that the aggregate limits do little to combat political corruption
and instead, extremely restrict an individual’s right to participate in the democratic
process.134 The Court began by stating, “any regulation must . . . target what we
have called quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.”135 Though the Court
recognized the strong interest the Government has in combating corruption and its
appearance, the Court explained that the interest must be limited to a certain type of
corruption “in order to ensure that the Government's efforts do not have the effect
of restricting the First Amendment right of citizens to choose who shall govern
them.”136 The Court took issue with the dissent’s broad interpretation of
corruption, stating that the dissent “dangerously broadens the circumscribed
definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in our prior cases, and targets as
corruption the general, broad-based support of a political party.”137 The Court
believed that “the line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may
seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order to safeguard
basic First Amendment rights.”138
In addressing the Government’s concern about circumvention,139 the Court
126. Id. at 140.
127. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444.
128. Id. at 1443.
129. Id. at 1447.
130. Id. at 1452.
131. Id. at 1453.
132. Id. at 1460.
133. Id. at 1461.
134. Id. at 1442.
135. Id. at 1441.
136. Id. at 1462.
137. Id. at 1460.
138. Id. at 1451.
139. The circumvention argument stems from Buckley. In Buckley, the Court of Appeals found that
§608(e)(1) of the FECA of 1971 (a provision which limited expenditures by any person spending money
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believed that “the improbability of circumvention indicates that the aggregate limits
instead further the impermissible objective of simply limiting the amount of money
in political campaigns.”140 Further, the Court found the Government’s and
dissent’s examples of circumvention to be implausible. Instead of an aggregate
limit to prevent circumvention of individual limits, the Court believed that other
options would be more effective, including “restricting transfers . . . to require
contributions above the current aggregate limits to be deposited into segregated,
nontransferable accounts and spent only by their recipients.”141
Filing a separate concurrence, Justice Thomas recommended overturning
Buckley, stating that the Court’s decision in Buckley “denigrates core First
Amendment speech.”142 He argued that the bifurcated standard of review for
contributions and expenditures outlined in Buckley, requiring a lesser standard of
review for contributions, failed to withstand careful review.143 Thomas argued that
although the Court believed contributions were different in kind from expenditures,
both usually have some intermediary between the one contributing money and the
message, or the one spending the money to produce the message.144 Thomas
continued his concurrence by stating that the “remaining justifications Buckley
provided are also flawed” and therefore should be overturned.145 Although Justice
Thomas did not explicitly address corruption in his concurrence, he did state that he
is in full agreement that the “Government may not penalize an individual for
robustly exercising his First Amendment rights.”146 It can be implied that Justice
Thomas believes that corruption is not a strong enough justification to restrict a
person’s First Amendment rights.
In their dissent, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan took issue
with the Court’s definition of corruption and advocated the importance of the
aggregate contribution limit. The dissent disagreed with the majority’s belief that
the aggregate limits do not further a significant governmental interest because,
according to the majority, given the individual limits, spending large amounts of
money on elections does not rise to corruption.147 The dissent recognized that this
belief was based on a “narrow definition of corruption that excludes efforts to
obtain influence over or access to elected officials or political parties.”148 The
dissent also disagreed with the majority’s belief that, because of the individual
limits, the aggregate limits do not function meaningfully.149 The dissent found it
impossible to reconcile the Court’s narrow definition of corruption in this case with
the Court’s broad definition in McConnell, because the Court’s definition in this
within a calendar year to advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate to $1000) was a loopholeclosing provision, meant to prevent circumvention of contribution limitations. Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 44 (1976).
140. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456.
141. Id. at 1458.
142. Id. at 1462 (Thomas, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 1462-63 (Thomas, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 1463.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1464.
147. Id. at 1465-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1466 (internal quotations omitted).
149. Id.
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case “excludes efforts to obtain influence over or access to elected officials or
political parties.”150 The dissent stated that aside from the Court’s holding in
Citizens United, case law has insisted upon a considerably broader definition of
corruption than what the Court held here.151 Worried, the dissent wrote that: “[i]n
the absence of limits on aggregate political contributions, donors can and likely
will find ways to channel millions of dollars to parties and to individual candidates,
producing precisely the kind of ‘corruption’ or ‘appearance of corruption’ that
previously led the Court to hold aggregate limits constitutional.”152
The dissent supported this view by providing three examples in which a donor
could produce corruption in the absence of an aggregate limitation. The first
example provided that a person would be able to donate $1.2 million dollars over
two years to a political party; with aggregate limits, this was previously only
$74,600. 153 The dissent worried that without the aggregate cap, political parties
would organize in a way to ensure the legality of this greater donation.154 For
instance, each major political party has three national committees and fifty state
committees; to ensure the ease of large donations, each party could form a “Joint
Party Committee” and then allocate the large donations they receive accordingly.155
The dissent feared that this action would breed the same corruption the Court has
sought to avoid in the past: “elected officials . . . obliged to provide [the donor]
special access and influence, and perhaps even a quid pro quo legislative favor.”156
The second example the dissent provided was the increase in donations to
individual candidates.157 In a given election year, there are 435 House seats and
thirty-three Senate seats open for election.158 Without the aggregate limit, an
individual donor can now donate to their party’s candidate for every open seat; this
would equate to an additional $2.4 million every two-year election cycle.159 This
example combined with the previous example means that a wealthy individual
could now contribute $3.6 million every two years to their political party and its
candidates.160 The “Joint Party Committee” from the first example could now be
expanded to include each of these individual candidates for office.161 The dissent
feared that current law would allow these “Joint Party Committees” to shift these
large donations to a single candidate.162 “[A] party could proliferate these joint
entities,” carefully naming them to avoid earmarking rules.163 Then, these joint
party committees could each write the same single candidate a check.164 Even
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1471.
Id. at 1472.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1473.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

178

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1

though the initial $3.6 million donation from a single donor has to be divided up
according to limits placed on candidates and political parties, a loophole is created
to allow those candidates and political parties to reroute that money to a single
candidate.165 Thus, $2.37 million of the single donor’s $3.6 million donation could
be rerouted to a single candidate.166 The dissent feared that this routing and
rerouting routine would be explained to a donor in order to circumvent individual
donation limitations, and the candidate receiving the donation would learn who the
donor was—perhaps leading to the obligation of providing special access and
influence to the donor.167
Finally, the third example from the dissent provided that there would be a
proliferation of political action committees.168 A rich donor could donate $10,000
(over the course of two years) to 200 PACs created by party supporters.169 Nine
other donors could do the same, bringing the total to $20,000 per PAC.170 Each
PAC would have $100,000 and would then write 10 checks to the most embattled
candidates for $10,000 each.171 If this were a concerted effort, each candidate
would then get $2 million total.172 Although a candidate would not know who
specifically donated the money they received from each PAC, they would likely
know who the big ten donors were.173 According to the dissent, examples two and
three exemplify the anti-circumvention argument in campaign finance without
aggregate limits, while all three examples demonstrate the possibility for
corruption, either through influence, special access, or quid pro quo.
IV. THE COURT’S DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION IN MCCUTCHEON IS TOO
NARROWLY DRAWN AND SHOULD BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE
CIRCUMVENTION AND IMPROPER INFLUENCE
In its opinion, the majority used the narrow definition of corruption, quid pro
quo corruption or outright bribery, to determine that aggregate limits violate the
First Amendment.174 The Court refused to consider the prevention of influence
through donations and circumvention of other limits to be an adequate justification
for regulation.175 The Government’s justification for the aggregate limits should
have provided sufficient justification for the Court to uphold the aggregate limits.
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court has very narrowly defined corruption to
exclude circumvention and influence, Congress should pass a law expanding the
definition of corruption to include these acts.
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A. The Government’s Justification for the Act was Correct
The Supreme Court never reached the standard of review question because,
according to the Court, there was a “substantial mismatch between the
Government’s stated objective and the means selected to achieve it.”176 However,
the Government’s stated objective for the enactment of the BCRA (anti-corruption
and anti-circumvention of campaign finance law) was achieved by the BCRA
aggregate limits. When President George Bush signed BCRA into law he stated
that the Act: “will result in an election finance system that encourages greater
individual participation, and provides the public more accurate and timely
information, than does the present system.”177
At the time FECA was passed, its justification was called into question as well.
In Buckley, the Court held that FECA was justified by three governmental interests:
[T]he prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the
real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates'
positions and on their actions if elected to office . . . mute[s] the voices of affluent
persons and groups in the election process and thereby to equalize the relative
ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections, . . . [and] act as a brake on
the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns and thereby serve to open the political
system more widely to candidates without access to sources of large amounts of
178
money.

Although the Court believed FECA was justified for all three of the above
reasons, the Court stated that it was “unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary
purpose to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large
individual financial contributions” to justify its constitutionality.179 Since Buckley,
the Supreme Court has focused on that sole justification when balancing an act’s
intrusion on a person’s First Amendment rights.
In McCutcheon, the Court focused on the Government’s anti-circumvention
and anti-corruption interests.180 Perhaps it was the fault of the Government to not
raise one of the remaining justifications in Buckley.181 As mentioned above, one of
the justifications raised in Buckley was to “mute the voices of affluent persons and
groups . . . to equalize the ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of
elections.”182 Although this justification, in terms of equalizing political
participation, has been found to be insufficient by the Supreme Court since
Buckley,183 this justification can also go to the broader definition of corruption: the
176. Id. at 1446.
177. George W. Bush, President Signs Campaign Finance Reform Act, THE WHITE HOUSE (March
27, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020327.html.
178. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976).
179. Id. at 26.
180. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450-56.
181. The third justification provided in Buckley, to prevent the increased cost of campaigns, does not
speak to the Court’s definition of corruption and will not be discussed in this Note in further detail. See
supra note 67.
182. Id. at 25.
183. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008) (finding that asymmetrical
contribution limits were unconstitutional because “[l]eveling electoral opportunities means making and
implementing judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an
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appearance of improper access. Aggregate limits on campaign contributions
prevent a person from donating more than $123,200 a year; without these limits, it
is estimated that the new cap on aggregate donations by a single person could reach
$3.5 million.184
To put this in perspective, it is helpful to look at the numbers. Just shy of 10
million people in the United States have a net-worth of greater than $1 million
dollars;185 however, the United States has a population of an estimated 316,128,839
people.186 In the 2011-2012 election cycle, the Huffington Post found forty-nine
donors to be well over the aggregate contribution limits, demonstrating that a few
affluent people significantly contribute to elections.187 Without the aggregate
limits, the appearance of elections being bought by a few wealthy individuals may
cause people to believe their contribution has no effect on the outcome of an
election, and thus lose interest in the democratic process. The aggregate limits
serve to prevent the appearance that a few wealthy individuals buy elections to
influence policy or to benefit themselves, much like when individuals made
significant donations to the Nixon campaign to later be appointed to an
ambassadorship.
B. Corruption Should be Defined More Broadly Than Quid Pro Quo
The Majority’s definition of corruption in McCutcheon only included quid pro
quo corruption. In its eyes, corruption is only corruption if a contributor gives
money to a candidate in exchange for a vote or other favor (or the appearance that a
contributor gave money to a candidate in exchange for a vote or other favor). Quid
pro quo: “where, say, a donor gives money with the understanding that the
politician will do a specific thing in return.”188 An example of quid pro quo
corruption is a California state senator who accepted $100,000 in bribes from
undercover FBI agents posing as Hollywood movie executives in exchange for

election,” which should be for the voters to decide, not Congress); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2822 (2011).
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185. Emily Jane Fox, Number of millionaire households in the U.S. reaches high, CNN (March 14,
2014, 10:55 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/14/news/economy/us-millionaires-households/. This
figure includes only households worth more than $1 million, this number would be significantly lower
for those who are worth multi-millions and would be in a position to donate $3.5 million to a campaign.
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states/00000.html (last updated Jul. 8, 2014). This number does include children and others who would not be
able to vote.
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Oversight, HUFFINGTON POST (May 3, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/03/campaigncontribution-limits_n_3132474.html.
188. Robin Abcarian, Did the Supreme Court just open the door to political corruption?, L.A. TIMES
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2014]

MCCUTCHEON V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

181

directing legislation in their favor.189
The dissent argued for a broader definition, including the appearance of
influence, which could result in a cynical public who, in turn, loses interest in
political participation altogether.190 Relying on the dissent in McConnell, the
McCutcheon dissenters argued that the Court’s definition of corruption would
exclude “influence over or access to elected officials, because generic favoritism or
influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First Amendment analyses.”191 An
example of this broader definition of corruption is a mayor who accepted bribes
from businessmen “in exchange for access to city officials responsible for planning,
zoning and permitting.”192
Empirical studies suggest the McCutcheon dissent might be right. According
to one study, even if quid pro quos were not to occur, money could still bias a
candidate’s policy choices.193 For example, fundraising considerations may weigh
on the minds of candidates, leading them to vote a certain way or support specific
legislation.194 Over time, candidates would be “subject to many pressures to
behave in ways that may hide their true beliefs.”195 Another study found that
Congressional members meet more frequently with donors than non-donors.196
That study concluded that those who can afford to contribute to campaigns have a
higher likelihood of commanding greater attention from influential
policymakers.197 Although the study did not address why influential policymakers
were more likely to meet with large campaign contributors, the conclusions display
the influence campaign contributors can have on Congressional candidates.198
Corruption is broader than quid pro quo corruption and in the past the Supreme
Court has recognized this. However, with the Court’s ruling in McCutcheon, the
Court continues to employ a definition that is too narrow and excludes the
corruption Congress meant to protect elections against. If the Court refuses to
recognize the capacity of potential corruption in politics, Congress should act to
create a statute defining corruption in a broader scope.
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V. CONCLUSION
“We all know that money is the chief source of corruption.”199 “We all know
that large contributions to political campaigns . . . put the political party under
obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in the way of legislation.”200
With the Court’s holding in McCutcheon, the obligation that comes from a large
contribution does not count as corruption. In discussing the Court’s holding in
McCutcheon, journalist Ari Berman wrote, “under the leadership of Chief Justice
John Roberts, the Supreme Court has made it far easier to buy an election and far
harder to vote in one.”201 Before the Supreme Court ruled on McCutcheon, the
Washington Post predicted the future of campaign finances should the aggregate
limits be struck down.202 The predictions included wealthy donors having a greater
influence, an increase in size and power for joint fundraising committees, and the
eventual demise of individual limits.203 While McCutcheon does not eliminate
campaign finance regulation, it is an obvious step in that direction. The U.S.
Congress should act and pass a law to overturn the Supreme Court’s troubling
narrow quid pro quo definition of corruption to protect the anti-corruption interest
in American democracy.
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